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The Incentive Effects of Tournaments: 
The PGA Australasian Tour 1991 
Erkin I. Bairam and John M. Howells* 
This paper examines the relationship betlveen the structure of tournament incentives and 
individual performance. Although it follo-w.'s recent research on Professional Golf 
Association tournaments in the United States and Europe, it concentrates on the PGA 
Australasian Tour in 1991 for l~hich financial incentives on average are much less 
attractive than .for tourna1nents in the northern hemisphere. The results strongly confirm 
that tournan1ents do have an incentive effect. The incentive effects that such tournament-
~vpe reu'ard structures are clearly shown to have may be applicable not only to professional 
sport hut also to industrial li'age structures. Tournament models can offer a different 
perspective on the extent to which pay influences performance at the firm level. 
Introduction 
Essentially, efficiency-wage models are bas,ed on the proposition that the structure of 
compensation affects the productivity of workers. The presumption is that employee work 
effort, or efficiency, is a positive function of the wage rate: the higher the wage the finn 
pays, the harder its employees work. Although there are a number of different 
microeconomic foundations for these models (Akerlof, 1984; Yellen, 1984; Akerlof and 
Yellen, 1986; Stiglitz, 1987), the underlying assumption is the existenc,e of a positive wage-
productivity nexus. Since sporting competitions offer a reliable pool of data to test certain 
economic hypotheses (in contrast to the paucity of accurate measures both of employee 
effort and company incentive structures), it is not surprising that interest in the relationship 
between compensation structures and performance has ~encouraged res,earch in tournament 
models (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; ~Carmichael, 1983; Green and Stokey, 1983; Malcomson, 
1984~ Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1984; O'Keefe, Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 1984; Rosen, 1986; 
McLaughlin, 1988). Intuitively, given both the level and distribution of prize money, one 
might expect tournament rewards to offer individuals an incentive to provide improved 
levels of performance. 
To test whether tournaments do in fact encourage appropriate effort responses, recent 
research by Ehrenberg and Bognanno ( 1990 a and b) has focus~ed on Professional Golf 
Association (PGA) tournaments in the United States in 1984 and Europe in 1987. This 
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provides an extremely useful testing proced 
information on actual incentive structures 
individual performance. The present stud 
Australasian Tour wher~ it is worth 
appreciably less than the two PGA circuits ia 
The 1991 PGA Australasian Tour 
This study covers the 13 tournaments in ct. 1991 
Following Ehrenberg and Bognanno, it 
(or sudden-death) competitions. Each toum 
60 players are eligible to take part in the 
therefore, the individual plays against the rest of 
Since the lowest score over 72 holes wins, 
players to score less than other competitors in tb• 
TABLE I 
Australian Tournaments and 
Tournament Prize Money 
(A$) 
Johnnie Walker Classic 1,000,000 
Australian Open 700,000 NZ ()pea 
Australian PGA 250,000 
South Australian Open 200,000 
NZ Shell Open 181,300 
Singapore PGA 150,000 Palm 
Perak Masters 150,000 
Source: see the Official PGA Tour Guide 1991. 
I In United States and European tournaments iDCJililllll 
appropriate exchange rates to convert to ~""'"·• 
A$200,000; over 38 percent of Australasian 
exceeded A$500,000 in 77 percent of U 
Australasian tournaments. For Australasian 
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The level of prize money varied considerably across tournaments. Howev~er, the procedure 
for allocating total prize money, based on the rank order of the final 6? players at the en_d 
of each tournament, did not change during the Tour. The essenttal aspects of thts 
procedure, illustrated in Table II, are similar to the st~cture _for distributing prize mo~ey 
in the United States and European Tours surveyed tn prev1ous research. Australasian 
tournaments, therefore, also exhibit the critical featur~e of the structure of financial rewards, 
namely, that there is a much higher marginal return for improving performance in the final 
round by one rank to those close to the tournament leader than to those close to the bottom. 
In the Palm Meadows Cup, for example, the marginal return for coming first rather than 
second was A$86,000 and for coming second rather than third was A$46,800. Compare 
this with the difference of A$240 for coming fifty-ninth rather than 'last. Given information 
on total priz~e money and the fixed allocation procedure, it is possible to examine the 
relationship between performanoe and both the I ~ev~el of prize money and marginal returns 
to effort in the final round. 
TABLED 
• 
Distr,ibution of Prize Money by Selected Ranks 
Rank 
Prize Money 
(0/o) 
Rank 
Prize Money 
(0/o) 
1 
18.0 
8 
2.98 
2 
I 0.8 
9 
2.7 
3 
6.9 
10 
2.36 
4 
4.98 
20 
1 . l 
Source: see the Official PGA Tour Guide 1991 
5 
4.16 
30 
0.7 
6 
3.82 
40 
0.5 
7 
3.42 
50 
0.3 
60 
0.1 
All golf tournaments operate a complex system of exemptions relating to eligibility. For 
Australasian Tours, automatic ~entry (or exemption) is granted to the leading 60 players from 
the previous year's Tour, the J,eading five or ten players from other international tours in 
the previous year, winners of major tournaments in Australia or New Zealand., and 
Australian and New Zealand winners of major overseas tournaments. Those not granted 
exemption must qualify by their performance in a pre-qualifying round held prior to a 
~p:cific tournament. Given that tournaments will include ex~empt and non-exempt players, 
tt ts possible that the relationship between financial incentive and perfo1 1nance will be 
different for the two groups.2 To allow for this, the model is estimated for both groups. 
2 One view is that 'better players are, in fact, more responsive to fmancial incentives' (Ehrenberg and 
BognaJUlo, 1990a: 1322). On the other hand, many of the better exempt players on the Australasian 
Tour_ are successful in northern hemisphere tournaments where fmancial rewards are much greater. 
It m1ght be assumed, therefore, that the incentive to improve performance on the less lucrative 
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The model: specification and estima 
The model to be estimated Gustified below) is 
where 
FS.J 
EX. 
EX. 
AOJ 
RQiJ 
p~ 
= final score (after four rounds) by individual i 
= 1 if i has automatically qualified to enter 
= 0 if i has not automatically qualified ( 
= I if the Australian Open; AOJ = 0 if otberwfttf 
= PA. I TAi1 
= i 's scoring average for the Tour 
TA.J 
NTj 
= mean value of P A. for all i who finished . •' . ' " ' d ~ : •• 1 I ,. ,! :;.. ' 'I j 
PCJ 
CLJ 
PZJ 
E.J 
= number of top 20 money winners who flnisW 
= par for the tournament course j 
= course length for the tournament course j 
= total tournament prize money (in 000 
= disturbance tenn 
Although limited to some extent by the scope of tile 
includes many of the tournament-specific variables · 
are factors that exist in tournaments which can be exp•c 
for any given incentive structure. Par for the course 
exam pie, give an indication of the degree of Y&&• 
Additional information available to Ehrenberg and 
of the playing difficulty of a course and the 
conditions could have impaired player perfonnance, 
Tour.3 A dummy variable (A01) is included for 
tournament in the Tour; winning the Open has 
of prize money to include future sponsorship aacl 
order to examine the possibility that the 
performance will vary between different grollpt 
from non-exempt players (EX.) and considers 
money \Vinners on the 1991 Australasian Tour 
There are, however, differences in the ap 
Ehrenberg and Bognanno. For example, the 
individual perfonnance on the Australasian T 
Australasian Tour differs little between exemp~ 
achieve exemption status. 
The Official PGA Tour Guide I 99 I does offer 
is not detailed enough to gauge \\'ith any 
performance. 
' : ·,, 1 • _Ill 1 " I ' • I 'l : 
· r ~· ' , .. ~ ; 
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(FSu). It was not possible to test the "final-round score equation" s~ecified in Ehrenb~rg 
and Bognanno4 for two reasons. One, their particular model has a simultaneous equation 
nature which is estimated by using instrum ~ental variable techniques~ this was not possible 
in the present study due to the non-linear nature of the approach adopted. Two, the final-
round score approach could generate negative (variable) values \vhich are impossible to use 
with the Box-Cox procedures. Another difference is that a player's scoring average for the 
Australasian Tour (PA,) and the mean value of PA. for all i who finished tournament j 
(TAu) are combined as RQu = PA. I T A,J. Ehr~nberg and Bognanno use these as separate 
variables in their estimated equations. This raises a number of concerns. One, because PA. 
and TA,J are absolute m~easures (whereas RQ.J is a r~elative measure), including them 
separately does not properly r~epresent the relative quality of the il" player. A relative 
measure tests that the above av~erage player's chances of winning are good if he performs 
up to his potential, and that a belovJ average player needs to perform better in order to win. 
Two, the simple correlation coefficient between PA and T A is high which might indicate 
serious multicollinearity. Entering them separately did show the estimated coefficients to 
be statistically insignificant. 
It is clear that ~equation (I) cannot be estimat~ed unless one makes explicit assun1ptions about 
the functional relationship between the explanatory variables and FSu. Ehrenberg and 
Bognanno make a priori assumptions about the functional form \vithout any statistical tests. 
Here, for the first time, the appropriate form will be ~explicitly tested. For this purpose, the 
Box-Cox (1964) general transformation function will be used and, hence, the specification 
given in the Appendix will be estimated. 
The results and implications 
The summary statistics for each variable under consideration are reported in Table III. 
Estimates of the non-linear model specified in the appendix and its restricted versions (the 
linear and log-linear models) for the entire sample (n = 820), the exempt players (n = 364) 
and the non-ex~empt players (n = 456) are reported in Table IV. 
It can be s~een from the nine equations pres~ented that the conclusions that can be drawn 
from the thr~ee different samples used are the sam~e and, therefore, the qualitative 
implications of different equations are identical. This robustness is also confirmed by the 
restrictions on the ~unctional form. Although, using appropriate likelihood ratio tests, the 
estimated equations obtained conclusively show that the linear model (A. = 1) is not 
appropriate, it still yields qualitative results which are consistent with the non-restricted 
specification and the mor~e appropriate log-linear specification. 
The 4 final-round score equation· tests \\'hether the financial incentive of greater marginal returns fron1 
in1proving one ·s ranking in the last round leads to a lo\\·er final-round score. This is discussed in 
Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a, 1318-1321 and 1990 b, 81-85). To estimate ho\v total prize money 
influences performance in the first two rounds of a tournament, Ehrenberg and Bognanno ( I990a, 
1315-1318) also include a ·score after second-round equation· for the 1984 United States 
tournaments. The results show that prize money does not influence performance in the early stages 
of a tournament. The same approach was actually adopted for the Australasian Tour and the results 
are not statistically significant and are not reported. 
ao <XJ a2 
ENTIRE SAMI1LE (n = 820): 
(I) 0.324 
-O.Cl03 0.022 
(-1.67)* (-14.36) ( 18.06) 
{2) 
-0.224 
-0.006 0.049 
(-0.78)* (-4.38) ( 18.21) 
(3) 
-261.120 
-1.625 13.610 
(-9.24) (-4.108) ( 17.06) 
EXEMPT PLAYERS (n = 364): 
(I) -1.922 0.157 
(-1.73)* (9.90) 
(2) 0.473 
'I'AIILI~ IV 
Estin1ated Equations for the 1991 PGA Australasian Tour 
Pt 
0.299 
(15.76) 
0.662 
(15.76) 
180.920 
( 14.44) 
1.895 
(6.38) 
P2 
0 .017 
( 16.1 I) 
0 .029 
( 15.87) 
0.792 
(11.678) 
0.055 
(7.51) 
P3 
1.229 
(17.53) 
1.484 
(17.47) 
5.389 
(15.817) 
1.947 
( 10.74) 
1.461 
(10.73) 
P4 
-0.060 
( -1.38)* 
-0.043 
(-1.58)* 
-0.003 
(-2.29) 
-0.025 
(-1.13)• 
p 
-0.024 
(-14.09) 
-0.023 
( -14.36) 
-0.012 
(-13.53) 
0.018 
(-7.33) 
-v-
0\ 
R2 LLF = A. x2 ., 
-· 
., 
., 
a 
~ 
= 
-0.14 0.466 
-2491.4 Q. 
= c 
0 0.466 
-2491.9 t.o+ ~ ft 
-
-r. 
I 0.430 
-2518.9 54.0 
0.21 0.354 
-1121.8 
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All estimated coefficients, except P~ (namely, the course length), are statistically significant 
at the conventional test levels with correct signs. This clearly suggests that all the variables 
but one listed in Table IV play a statistically significant role in explaining the final score 
(FS ). Given the major thrust of the present study, it is important to note that the prize 
mo~ey coefficient, p, has the correct sign (negative) and is highly significant i~ all n~ne 
estimated equations. This patently confirms that total prize money does offer an tncenttve 
to improve the level of performance even though financial incentives, on the whole, are 
appreciably less than P·GA tournam·ents in the United States and Europe. 
TABLE Ill 
Descriptive Statistics ~or the Entire Sample (n = 820) 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
FS.J 290.07 6.92 271.00 309.00 
EX. 0.45 0 .50 0 .00 1.00 
AOj 0 .078 0.268 0.00 1.00 
RQ.J 0.99 0.02 0.94 1.07 
NTJ 10.43 4.72 2.00 18.00 
PCJ 71 .92 0.83 70.00 73 .00 
CLJ 6251.40 239.20 5771.00 6682.00 
PZJ 475 .81 335.28 150.00 1200.00 
Note: for the definition of variables see t ~ext. 
Some results deserve additional comment. The coeffici·ent a:h for the Australian 'Open, is 
significant but has a positive sign. This runs counter to Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a: 
1314 and 1990b: 80). Their results show that scores are lower for major tournaments in 
the United States and Europe which offer a range of financial inducements in excess of total 
prize money. Although "rewards" for the Australian Open are similarly attractive, higher 
scores are exp.lained by the course being prepared deliberately as a much tougher test for 
golfers than other tournaments on the Australasian Tour. 5 The coefficient P4, for the length 
of a course, suggests it has a negative but statistically insignificant effect on the tournam·ent 
score. Again, the Ehrenberg-Bognanno results ( 1990a: 1314 and 1990b: 80) show the 
opposite: increasing the length of a course increases the final scor·e statistically significantly. 
This suggests that cours~e length adversely affects United States and European players, but 
Most tournament courses are prepared consistently to standards set by the PGA. Conditions 
relating to the Australian Open (and the NZ Shell Open for that matter) are determined bv a 
·local committee' \vhich makes the course tougher than standards nom1ally in1posed by ·the 
PGA. 
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has no significant effect on Australasian pia 
One reason for this is that courses, on av 
most of those used for tournaments on the 
longer courses used on the Australasian T 
than long courses in the northern hemisp 
acknowledged as a severe test of a player' 
Australasian Tour are a little easier than s ....... 
performance - those relating to the relative 
top twenty money winners (f3 2) and course 
Ehrenberg and Bognanno' s results. Howevttr. 
Tour, unlike United States and European 
incentive to improve perforn1ance does not 
players. 
In contrast to recent interest in tournament 
productivity is influenced by the size of the 
reasons, particularly in situations where the 
workers and firms exists, it may prove pro 
market rate. One explanation for this is that 
turnover and a consequent saving in hiring cu8 
will attract a higher quality labour force. A-
potential earnings elsewhere) generate an 
discharge. In this case, the fiint benefits 
monitoring costs. In addition, it has been arJUid 
employer encourages a reciprocal "gift" of i 
Smith, 1991 : 423). The present study confinM 
tournament-type incentive structures as one 
Conclusion 
Central to the theory of tournaments is the h 
and the distribution of this prize money, fi 
improved levels of perfonnance. Applied 
implies that increases in prize money will I 
Australasian Tour of 1991 clearly confirms thi 
IV play a significant role in explaining the 
highly significant and has the correct sign. 
The reliable pool of data from sporting com 
hypotheses (see Goff and Tollison, 1990). Of 
extent to which it supports the basic proposi 
that the structure of compensation affects -r,..., 
Tour encourages desired effort responses; 
positive wage-productivity nexus. 
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Appendix 
The estimated equations which are examined in the text wer~e obtained from the follovv'i:ng 
non-linear Box-Cox specification: 
f(FS.) = (X0 + a, EX. + ~a2 AOJ + P./(RQ.) + ,PJ(NTJ) 
+ P~f(PC) + P4/(CLJ) + pf(PZ) + E.J (lA) 
where f(x) = (xA-1) I A. 
Equation ( 1 A) gives the Ehrenberg and Bognanno model which is linear and yields the log-
linear constant elasticity model when A = 0 (see, for ~example, Bairam, 1991 a and b; 
Bairam and Howells, 1989). A problem with the above specification, however, is that it 
assumes that the transformation simultaneously yields the appropriate functional form and 
disturbances (E.J) that are approximately not rnally distributed and homoscedastic. Zarembka 
( 197 4) showed that when E.J are heteroscedastic the estimated 'A wi II be biased in the 
direction required for the transformed dependent variable to be nearly homoscedastic. To 
overcome this problem, equation (1A) was estimated by the appropriate maximum 
likelihood method available in the Shazam computer programme (see White, 1974). 
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